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Abstract
Background: The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is a widely used paradigm to study cooperation in
evolutionary biology, as well as in fields as diverse as moral philosophy, sociology, economics and
politics. Players are typically assumed to have fixed payoffs for adopting certain strategies, which
depend only on the strategy played by the opponent. However, fixed payoffs are not realistic in
nature. Utility functions and the associated payoffs from pursuing certain strategies vary among
members of a population with numerous factors. In biology such factors include size, age, social
status and expected life span; in economics they include socio-economic status, personal
preference and past experience; and in politics they include ideology, political interests and public
support. Thus, no outcome is identical for any two different players.
Results: We show that relaxing the assumption of fixed payoffs leads to frequent violations of the
payoff structure required for a Prisoner's Dilemma. With variance twice the payoff interval in a
linear PD matrix, for example, only 16% of matrices are valid.
Conclusions: A single player lacking a valid PD matrix destroys the conditions for a Prisoner's
Dilemma, so between any two players, PD games themselves are fewer still (3% in this case). This
may explain why the Prisoner's Dilemma has hardly been found in nature, despite the fact that it
has served as a ubiquitous (and still instructive) model in studies of the evolution of cooperation.
Background
The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) has generated many hun-
dreds of publications [1,2] spanning the biology, moral
philosophy, sociology, economics and political science
literature [1,3–6]. It received special attention because it
sets paradoxical conditions to examine how and when co-
operation can evolve even when a rational player is bound
to defect. As a result, a large body of literature has grown
up around the problem of finding optimal strategies for
playing the game but "the preoccupation with new and
improved strategies has sometimes distracted from the
main point: explaining animal cooperation" [7]. Recent
publications have concentrated on how special condi-
tions such as kin selection [3], iterated interactions [8],
spatial structuring [9] or indirect reciprocity through rep-
utation [10] can escape the paradox and lead to evolution
of cooperation. Other studies pushed the iterated PD con-
cept further to identify optimal strategies when players'
decisions are not made simultaneously [11–13] or when
players have payoffs that are not symmetrical [14].
Our aim is not to criticise these theoretical developments
at all. Rather, we suggest a reason for why PD may be rel-
atively rare in the first place, and therefore point out that
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such special conditions (to permit cooperation despite the
PD) need not be invoked if the game is not common in
nature anyway. As Clements & Stephens [7] wrote: "Un-
derstanding the ambiguities surrounding the Iterated Pris-
oner's Dilemma has stimulated 14 years of ingenious
biological theorizing. Yet despite this display of theoreti-
cal competence, there is no empirical evidence of non-kin
cooperation in a situation, natural or contrived, where the
payoffs are known to conform to a Prisoner's Dilemma".
These authors (Clements & Stephens) were interested in
suggesting mutualism as an alternative model of coopera-
tive behaviour to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD),
after finding no empirical evidence for the latter in exper-
imental settings.
Treatments of Prisoners Dilemma, and many other types
of games, assume identical payoff matrices (or expected
utility), for all players. However, in nature this is highly
unlikely. In humans, for example, various studies find
outcomes of Prisoner's Dilemma to be dependent on sub-
ject-to-subject variation [2,15], including in personality
traits [16]. Among animals, we expect similar variation to
be dependent on expected reproductive consequences of
certain outcomes, which are of more or less value to indi-
viduals depending on their size, age, sex, health, condi-
tion, social status, coalition membership, expected life
span, available mates, food availability and so on. We
therefore suggest that the Prisoner's Dilemma may not be
a valid model where individual variation in payoffs dis-
rupts the essential structure of the game. Our simulations
in this paper test what degree of variation cause PD games
to become rare.
Of course, capturing the essence of complicated behav-
iour using simple models is an important step in theory
development, and it is easy to challenge such models by
pointing out elements or complications that are missing.
However, the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm has become
so prevalent in the cooperation literature that it has per-
haps not been challenged enough. The implicit assump-
tion in the PD game that different individuals do not vary
in their payoffs for certain interactions is so fundamental-
ly important that we suggest it may pose a critical prob-
lem, rather than just "another" complication, for the
Prisoner's Dilemma model.
Once varying payoffs in interactions are considered, all
such games can be seen to be various special cases of "bi-
ological markets" [17], a set of theories which describe the
trade of commodities between individuals and, impor-
tantly, do not constrain utility functions across individu-
als. Goods are commonly valued differently by each actor,
leading to the focus on "zones of potential agreement" in
the economic literature, where transactions occur within a
region where individuals approach, but do not reach,
their ideal payoff. Indeed, payoffs vary in time as well as
between individuals – cooperation may be the best option
under certain circumstances but not under others. Such
variation is highly dependent on the state of the individu-
al, or in other words, the identity of both you and your op-
ponent. As people, for example, we all have different
utility functions depending on numerous biological and
extraneous variables. For instance, a loan is typically more
valuable to the borrower than the lender, and in negotiat-
ing it the participants represent these highly asymmetrical
payoff matrices.
The classical pay-off matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma de-
fines values which satisfy the required inequality T > R > P
> S, and R > (T + S) / 2 [18–20] (The latter inequality is to
prevent the possibility that players collude and split the
payoffs). This denotes the temptation to defect (T), which
is the best option against the reward for mutual coopera-
tion (R) which is in turn better than mutual defection (P),
with the worst payoff coming from the Sucker's payoff (S)
for cooperating when the opponent defects. Hence, ra-
tional players should always defect regardless of what the
opponent does (in both a one shot game and for predict-
ed responses over repeated games due to backward induc-
tion from an expected final defection), leading to the
question of why cooperation emerges. The game has at-
tracted considerable attention because it seems useful to
deduce why humans and animals cooperate in such
games when the temptation to defect is the rational solu-
tion. However, before investigating this apparent paradox,
why should these inequalities (of T, R, P and S) and, thus,
this particular game be particularly common? If it is not,
then cooperation may not be surprising or paradoxical af-
ter all. For example, as soon as the sucker's payoff exceeds
the punishment for mutual defection (S > P) and every-
thing else stays the same (i.e. T > R > S > P), one enters a
new game, "chicken" (also called the "snowdrift" or
"hawk-dove" game), in which one no longer necessarily
expects mutual defection [4]. Indeed, if R > T and S > P,
then the game becomes "mutualism," in which players are
expected to cooperate all the time, regardless of what the
opponent does [7].
In support of this view, and despite the voluminous liter-
ature, examples of Prisoner's Dilemma in nature are virtu-
ally non-existent. One of the heralded potential examples,
predator "inspection" in shoaling fish [21] has proved
something of a controversy [20]. Various authors have
questioned whether the observed behaviour is coopera-
tion maintained by reciprocity in a Prisoner's Dilemma at
all, rather than simple by-product mutualism [22] or
some other mechanism [23,24]. In general, other candi-
date models to explain altruism among non-relatives have
tended to be ignored [19,25,26], and the usefulness ofBMC Evolutionary Biology 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/2/15
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Prisoner's Dilemma as a paradigm for the study of coop-
eration is beginning to be brought into question [27].
Firstly then, the particular inequalities of certain games
may not be likely anyway. But even where they are, more
importantly, we show that variance in payoffs among in-
dividuals (i.e. individual-specific utility functions) can, in
itself, violate the pre-requisite inequality of the payoffs in
the matrix. How high does this variation have to be, be-
fore such prescribed games become unimportant?
Results and discussion
Model of asymmetry in payoffs
If a payoff has an expected (mean) value of p, but residual
error variance  dependent on the player's utility func-
tion, then the actual payoff p' will be:
p' = (p + )
Here we assume a normal distribution of errors,  ~ N (0,
2), which means actual payoffs will also be normally dis-
tributed p' ~ N (p, 2). The two-by-two payoff matrix for
examples of Prisoner's Dilemma and mutualism games
are depicted below, with a generic matrix involving T, R, P
and S, which will be used henceforth (Table 1).
The variance 2, for each of four payoff outcomes may
vary independently as 2
T, 2
R, 2
P, 2
S (where 2
T is the
variance of T, for example). Any one of these can destroy
the special conditions for PD. Thus, PD occurs if and only
if T > R > P > S, for all two-way interactions when T = R
= P = S = 0, as in previous literature or, at least, when
those variances are small enough not violate the > 1 ratios
of T/R, R/P and P/S.
Now, allowing variations in payoff, the actual payoff is the
expected payoff plus the variation in utility according to
the individual. So replacing T, R, P and S for unique payoff
symbols that incorporate both the initial starting payoff
and the payoff variance, the PD with varying payoffs can
be formalised, using the variances as described above,
thus:
(T + T) > (R + R) > (P + P) > (S + S)
The variance in any one term can destroy the special con-
ditions for PD (as it could any other prescribed fixed pay-
off game). It is clear then that, depending on the relative
values of the four payoffs, some region of a 3-D phase
space (with dimensions T/R, R/P and P/S) will describe
valid PD games, while other regions will describe other
games such as mutualism. However, both are just certain
regions within a larger universe of 24 possibilities in
which various other types of symmetric games will be en-
countered [4]. These other undefined regions all represent
different potential games so the whole is best described as
a market, since different individuals meeting each other
have different payoff matrices – or values – for tradable
commodities (obtained from cooperation or defection)
[17,28]. Prices change according to the relative value to
the "buyer" and "investor" and, since these vary, the inter-
actions between members of any one population can
move dynamically around the phase space, sometimes in
and out of special areas such as those defined as the Pris-
oner's Dilemma. If such instances are rare though, strate-
gies based on those games are useless.
Analytical solutions to variations in payoffs
A simple varying payoff structure can be analysed intui-
tively. Consider 1000 payoff matrices with fixed payoffs
Table 1: Payoffs for a generic two-by-two game, a typical Prisoner's Dilemma game payoff matrix and a typical Mutualism game payoff 
matrix.
Generic Prisoner's
 Dilemma
Mutualism
C DCDCD
CRS 3 0 5 1
DTP 5 1 3 0
C denotes cooperation and D denotes a defection by both row and column player. Payoffs in the generic game denote the temptation to defect (T), 
the reward for mutual cooperation (R), punishment for mutual defection (P), and the sucker's payoff (S). In Prisoner's Dilemma, T is the best option 
against R, which is in turn better than P, with the worst payoff coming from S – cooperating when the opponent defects. Mutual defection is the 
Nash equilibrium since it is better to defect regardless of which strategy the opponent plays. In Mutualism, R is the highest payoff and S approaches 
T, so cooperation is always the best option regardless of your opponent's move. Mutual cooperation is a strong Nash equilibrium as all other 
options are less profitable.BMC Evolutionary Biology 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/2/15
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plus normally distributed errors (~ N (0, 1)), with vari-
ance equal to the spacing between the payoffs in an arbi-
trary PD matrix (e.g. 3, 4, 5, 6). Neighbouring payoffs will
overlap, and therefore destroy rankings for PD, a predict-
able number of times according to the following logic. A
PD payoff matrix exists in which payoff X1 must be ranked
above payoff X2 (e.g. T and R, or, P and S). If the distribu-
tion of the higher payoff X1 is ~ N (1, 1), and the lower
payoff X2 ~ N (0, 1) then the probability of these two pay-
offs swapping rank is P(X2 - X1 > 0). Subtracting the two
distributions X1 - X2 gives another normal distribution
X1,2 (~ N (-1, 2)) (means are subtracted, variances
summed according to standard theory [29]), with which
we can test the exact probability that payoffs X1 and X2
swap ranks. This probability is P(X2 - X1 > 0), or equiva-
lently, P(X2 > X1). Since in a normal distribution the prob-
ability P(X  x) = P (Z  (x - )/), where  is the
distribution mean,  the standard deviation and Z the
standard normal variable [29], the probability the lower
payoff is higher than the higher payoff, when both vary as
~ N (0, 1), is:
1 - P (Z < (0 + 1) / 2),
= 1 - P (Z < 0.707),
= 1 - 0.76,
= 0.24.
Thus any neighbouring pair of payoffs will overlap 24% of
the time. However, since there are a total of four payoffs
that can overlap in this way, there are three separate ine-
qualities where a rank change can occur. Thus, the value
we want to know is the probability of at least one rank
change occurring in a 2  2 matrix. The solution to this
turns out to be unattainable analytically, since the proba-
bility of each rank change is not independent and thus it
requires solving integrals for four distributions condition-
al on two unknowns. An equation based on Bayes' Theo-
rem cannot therefore be solved. However, the solution
can be found instead by simulation.
Simulations of variance in payoffs
If we simulate matrices with imposed variations in payoff
values we can calculate the frequency of cases which do
not meet the conditions for Prisoners Dilemma. There are
two parameters that will affect this frequency: (1) the var-
iance and, (2) the linearity of intervals between the ranked
payoffs in the matrix.
(a) Basic simulation
To begin, we consider a (p, p + 1, p + 2, p + 3) matrix to
equalise payoff intervals. Each simulation drew 1000 ran-
dom numbers from a normal distribution with mean = 0
and variance = 1 and added these as normally distributed
random errors to the fixed payoffs in 1000 matrices. Next
we calculated all T/R, R/P and P/S values and determined
the number of matrices which retained the correct rank
structure for PD, i.e. those in which all ratios > 1. Means
and standard deviations of valid PD matrices were calcu-
lated from 5 simulations of 1000 matrices per model.
The payoff ratios can be investigated graphically (Figure
1), but only in 2-dimensions, so two graphs are shown.
For PD, a matrix must satisfy the requirement that all ra-
tios are > 1. There were only 376 valid PD matrices out of
1000 in this case (3, 4, 5, 6). Thus, only 37.6% of matrices
were valid Prisoner's Dilemmas (Figure 2), i.e. meeting
the condition of all three inequalities. We also simulated
results for a typical payoff matrix that is often cited in the
literature (0, 1, 3, 5) [1,30]. Only 633.2 of the 1000 ma-
trices (63.3%) were valid Prisoner's Dilemmas.
(b) Simulations with different amounts of variation
Different amounts of variation can be equated with
changes in payoff intervals (increasing the former is the
same as decreasing the latter). The more different payoffs
are from each other, the more random variation would be
required to cause rank changes. This is demonstrated in
the simulations in which relative variation was increased
(on a base matrix of 3, 4, 5, 6), through decreasing payoff
intervals, by 1.0, 0.5 to 0.25 increments (Figure 2). The
percentage of valid PD cases decreased from 37.6%, to
15.8%, to 9.1%. In other words, a PD matrix occurs only
15.8% of the time when the variance is twice the payoff
interval.
(c) Simulations with different linearity of payoffs intervals
The effect is insensitive to changes in absolute values, but
not to the linearity of the payoff intervals. In this simula-
tion, we varied one of the parameters, the spacing be-
tween payoffs (hereafter "payoff interval"). As payoff
intervals increase, the variance of the normally distributed
errors becomes relatively less important and cause less
rank changes, since overlaps are less likely when payoffs
are more separated from each other. Where this is mani-
fested only at one end of the payoff ranking sequence (i.e.
where there is non-linearity in payoff intervals, such as 0,
1, 3, 5), the largest intervals are more immune to rank
changes, relative to the more bunched up payoffs. There-
fore, fewest rank changes will occur in linear sequences
with large payoff intervals. This is demonstrated in the
simulations in which the linearity of payoffs was distorted
(Figure 2). This was simulated by increasing payoffs from
intervals of all 1.0 (matrix 3, 4, 5, 6), to intervals of 1.0,
2.0, 2.0 (matrix 0, 1, 3, 5 and 3, 4, 6, 8) and, doubling the
payoffs of the latter matrix, to intervals of 5.0, 4.0, 4.0
(matrix 3, 8, 12, 16). The percentage of valid PD cases in-
creased from 38.0%, to 61.7%, to 99.5%.BMC Evolutionary Biology 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2148/2/15
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Conclusions
Although people commonly look for, or frame, various
observed scenarios within a Prisoner's Dilemma, the game
will not always occur unless variation in payoffs is low.
This assumption is rarely, if ever, tested. We have demon-
strated that, starting from a common Prisoner's Dilemma
payoff structure, relatively small amounts of variation
drastically reduce the proportion of matrices that still con-
form to Prisoner's Dilemma. Moreover, while variance in
payoff can violate the required inequalities of payoffs for
a valid PD matrix, a PD game between two individuals is
invalid if just a single individual has an invalid PD matrix.
Thus, while we cited PD matrix violations, valid PD games
are even less likely still (Figure 2), because they are the
product of the independent probabilities of each individ-
ual having a PD matrix. For example, using the popular
(0, 1, 3, 5) matrix where the payoff variance is equal to the
smallest payoff interval, a proportion of only 0.6332
(0.400) games will be valid Prisoner's Dilemmas. This ef-
fect is greatly enhanced in the (3, 4, 5, 6) matrix, where the
proportion of valid games will be 0.3762 (0.141). Dou-
bling the variance leaves only 0.1582 (0.025) of valid PD
games. Therefore, relatively small variations may be
enough to discard PD as a useful model to apply. Certain-
ly, researchers may need to revise critical significance val-
ues in applying statistical methods to determine if PD
occurs in a study population.
As an example, animals which cooperate to remove ec-
toparasites from each other by allogrooming have former-
ly been thought to be in a Prisoner's Dilemma [31,32].
However, because ectoparasite burdens vary greatly
among individuals (in European badgers, Meles meles,
some individuals are recorded as having no ectoparasites
while others can have over 100), the relative payoffs for
different strategies and, therefore, the game individuals
find themselves in, will depend on the relative differences
between actors [33]. In the case of the badgers, ectopara-
sites carry lethal diseases, so coming into contact to en-
gage in cooperative allogrooming carries the risk of
Figure 1
Inequalities in simulated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) matrices. Values greater than 1 indicate that the ratio conforms to that part
of a valid PD matrix. All of three ratios must be > 1 for the entire matrix to conform to PD. These are representative graphs
for a single simulation on 1000 initial payoff matrices of (3, 4, 5, 6) after adding normally distributed errors of zero mean and a
variance of 1.0. Note that ratios can be quite large in cases where small payoffs (< 3.0) became even smaller after adding nega-
tive errors (P may be divided by an S approaching 0, in which case the value P/S becomes large). To avoid very high ratio values
we increased all initial mean payoff values in our simulations so that the minimum was three. The frequency of valid PD cases is
not affected by increasing absolute values of the payoffs.
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further contamination, as well as the prospect of having
one's own ectoparasites removed. This suggests that one's
relative ectoparasite burden (in comparison to that of a
potential partner in the game) will determine the game
and consequently whether one should cooperate or not
[33].
Other examples support the idea that payoff variation
may be key to resolving the emergence of cooperation in
supposed Prisoner's Dilemmas. A recent study of cooper-
ative territorial defence in lions, Panthera leo, described
the correct ranking structure for a Prisoner's Dilemma
[34,35]. However, cooperators did not retaliate against
defectors. Instead, they carried on cooperating with them
in future interactions, ruling out the tit-for-tat or Pavlov
strategies [8] and implying that they did not experience
the Prisoner's Dilemma despite the apparent PD matrix
[35]. Interestingly, individual strategies already varied be-
tween individuals in the population and, furthermore, ex-
perimental manipulation caused individuals to change
their strategies in unpredictable ways. That is, they did not
conform to the predictions of how they should have react-
ed according to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Two other popu-
lar examples fit our implicit prediction that PD is more
likely to occur if payoffs are fixed. First, the single uncon-
tested example of PD in nature arises in the interactions of
bacteriophages [36,37], simple RNA structures for which
payoff variation among individuals is unlikely because of
their uniform architecture (uniform, at least, in compari-
son to higher organisms). Second, a famous example of
PD comes from the trench-warfare of World War I [1], in
which opposing lines of troops preferred to cooperate in
maintaining a local peace rather than risk death in mutual
defection (and reversion to reciprocated attacks). Since
payoffs for each individual were derived in terms of risk of
death, variation among soldiers' preference orderings was
Figure 2
Simulations of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) matrices with added normally distributed random error of variance 1.0 in all cases.
Bars represent the number of matrices in which all inequalities for PD remained in tact, given as the mean +/- 2 standard devi-
ations (from 5 simulations) of valid PD matrices out of 1000. To determine whether inequalities conformed to PD, each of the
payoff ratios T/R, P/S and R/P were calculated, from which deviations from the requisite < 1 were used to detect violations of
each part of the PD ranking sequence. Diamonds represent the consequent number of valid PD games +/- 2 standard devia-
tions, between any two randomly drawn players, expected under the same parameters. Payoffs of 0 or 1 (as in the simulation
of the "typical" payoff matrix 0, 1, 3, 5) sometimes became negative after the addition of random error, in which case we
checked for inequalities with absolute values rather than ratios.
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unlikely. But even if not, this was essentially a game be-
tween groups, not individuals, so the payoff matrix is also
for the group and should tend towards constant mean val-
ues due to the Central Limit Theorem.
It is interesting to briefly consider public goods games,
given that they are essentially a generalization of PD to
several players in a group. In such situations, variation in
payoffs among individual players is again likely to affect
the outcome and the probability of cooperation. On the
negative side, some individuals may not incur such a high
cost for initiating widespread defection in subsequent
games. On the positive side, other individuals may incur
relatively lower costs in contributing to the public good,
resulting in a better overall outcome for the group even if
some defectors persist.
Prisoner's Dilemmas could be argued to reemerge even
where payoffs vary widely, because of the fact that adja-
cent payoffs will sometimes turn out to be very far apart,
rather than being very close together (and overlapping).
However, this will not salvage the situation as a Prisoner's
Dilemma game, because the crucial criterion remains, ex-
clusively, whether there are changes in the payoffs' rank
order. Absolute values of payoffs will not alter the game it-
self. Of course, if certain payoffs were systematically very
large and distant from other payoffs (e.g. if there were a
very large temptation to defect, T, relative to R), then this
may produce an enhanced selection pressure for strategies
that perform as though they are within a Prisoner's Dilem-
ma, even if the game is not valid 100% of the time. But
this logic is unlikely to hold, because if payoffs do indeed
vary, then the variation itself will prevent such events
from being systematic. In other words, overlaps between
payoffs will occur as often as large intervals between them,
but only the former alter the actual game experienced.
Furthermore, simulations have shown that differing val-
ues of T do not influence dominant strategies [12].
Further studies are needed to investigate what happens
when variable matrices meet each other. For example, if
rank changes are common, do players playing one type of
game in a population of mixed games tend overall to en-
courage or discourage cooperation in their neighbours?
Or, since optimal choices would be highly dependent on
the identity of players, can single dominant strategies still
be devised to deal effectively with opponents with varia-
ble payoffs (and therefore with unpredictable strategies).
Indeed, celebrated strategies such as "tit-for-tat" [1], or
"win-stay, lose-shift" [8] may not be robust enough to
evolve wherever PD occurs, in the best case, in less than in
100% of the games played within a population.
We end by reiterating the sentiments of Clements &
Stephens [7]: "Mutualism and the Prisoner's Dilemma
represent end points of a range of conceivable cooperative
situations. Perhaps it is time to explore the rich set of pos-
sibilities between mutualism and the Prisoner's Dilem-
ma". Certainly, with all the intense research and
enthusiastic application of PD to real world situations, we
may expect that we should have observed more convinc-
ing empirical support by now if it ever were to hold as a
paradigm befitting to it's immense theoretical appeal. We
suggest that the concept of biological markets provides a
good alternative framework for modelling variable games
[1,17,28,38]. At the least, future studies should justify the
assumption of zero payoff variation, given the importance
of its implications. Finally, while we have pointed out that
the PD game can be upset by payoff variation, it remains
for future research to probe the question of whether, and
how, noisy payoff matrices will actually promote or
hinder the evolution of cooperative behaviour itself.
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